INDOCHINA WAR
Compiled by Davies Saina Kalepa - Zambia 2012
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND
1. France began its conquest of Indochina
(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) in 1859 and by 1885 controlled most of it. Vietnamese resistance to French rule continued on and off in the decades
between the French conquest and the beginning of World War Two (WW II). In
1940, Japan invaded Indochina and defeated the French. A Vietnamese resistance
movement fought the Japanese occupation, and after Japan's defeat in 1945, the
Vietnamese resistance hoped to gain independence from the returning French. A
number of wars were fought leading to the Indochina war. Some of them are as
follows:
a. Vietnamese rebellions. French troops
landed in Vietnam in 1858 and by the mid 1880s they had established a firm grip
over the northern region. From 1885 to 1895, Phan Đình Phùng led a rebellion
against the colonizing power. Nationalist sentiments intensified in Vietnam,
especially during and after World War
One (WW I).
b. Franco-Siamese War of 1893. Territorial
conflict in the Indochinese peninsula for the expansion of French Colonies.
c. World War II. In September 1940, during WW II,
Japan's demands for military access to Tonkin with the invasion of French Indochina
(or Vietnam Expedition). This allowed Japan better access to China in
the Second Sino-Japanese War
against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek,
but it was also part of Japan's strategy for dominion over the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
d. French -Thai War (1940–1941). During
WW II, Thailand
took the opportunity of French weaknesses to reclaim previously lost
territories, resulting in the French-Thai War
between October 1940 and 9 May 1941.
2. On
9 March 1945, with France liberated, Germany in retreat, and the United States
ascendant in the Pacific, Japan decided to take complete control of Indochina. The Japanese
launched the Second French Indochina Campaign. The Japanese kept
power in Indochina until the news of their government's surrender came through
in August. After the war, France petitioned for the nullification of the 1938 Franco-Siamese Treaty and attempted to
reassert itself in the region, but came into conflict with the Viet Minh
(VM), a
coalition of Communist and Vietnamese nationalists under
French-educated dissident Ho Chi Minh. During World War
II, the United States had supported the Viet Minh in resistance against the
Japanese; the group had been in control of the countryside since the French
gave way in March 1945. The US on the other hand privately made it adamantly
clear that the French were not to reacquire French Indochina, after the war was
over.
3.
US President Roosevelt offered Chiang Kai-shek the entire
Indochina to be put under Chinese rule. After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops
under General Lu
Han
sent by Chiang Kai-shek invaded northern Indochina north of the 16th parallel
to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying forces, and remained there until
1946. After persuading Emperor Bảo Đại to abdicate in his
favour, on 2 September 2, 1945 President Ho declared independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV). But
before September's end, a force of British and French soldiers, along with captured Japanese troops, restored
French control. In 1950 Ho again declared an independent Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, which was recognized by the fellow Communist governments of China and the Soviet Union. Fighting lasted until
May 1954, when the Viet Minh won the decisive victory against French forces at
the grueling Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
AIM
4. The
aim of this paper is to highlight and analyse the Indochina campaign of 1940s
to 1950s in order to bring out the effects, impact and lessons learnt.
INTRODUCTION
5. The First Indochina War, also known
as the French Indochina War, was a major conflict in the Asian region known as
Indochina, which is made up of the modern nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos. The war was fought by France, the long-time colonial ruler in the
Indochina, and Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian Communist rebel forces. The War
begun on December 19, 1946 and ended
on August 1, 1954 with the defeat of the French following their
surrender to Viet Minh in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The VM were
controlled and ruled by Ho Chi Minh.
6. The first
Indochina war also involved the United States and Great Britain supporting the French side, while the
Soviet Union and China supported the VMs with equipment and training. After the
Communist victory in China in 1949, the Vietnamese were allowed the use of
southern China as a staging point for attacks into northern Vietnam. The War resulted in Vietnamese
Communist victory, division of Vietnam into the Communist North and
non-Communist South and independence of Laos and Cambodia.
7. Like
so many others of the 20th century, the Indochina War was not one war, but
several. It was a colonial and civil conflict, a hotspot in the Cold War, as
well as a social, cultural, intellectual, ideological, and economic battle for
many. It was a war of resistance with bold and courage. It is best described to
suit Chairman Mao’s words;
“Every Communist must grasp the
truth, Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao Zedong
PREPARATION
AND PLANNING
8. After
their defeat the Japanese Army gave weapons to the Vietnamese. In order to
further help the nationalists, the Japanese kept Vichy French officials and
military officers imprisoned for a month after the surrender. The Viet Minh had
recruited more than 600 Japanese soldiers and gave them roles to train or
command Vietnamese soldiers.
9. Since
the early stages of the war, General Giap, VM military Commander, knew his
enemy very well and initiated plans for their defeat. This is evident in the
switching from conventional to guerilla as he appreciated that his weak force
could not meet a strong French Force head on. Giap also took time to plan and
prepare for the final battle of Dien Bien Phu where he defeated the French.
10. The
French were a formidable army that had fought wars before, such as the Japanese
invasion of Indochina in 1940, therefore initially; they did very little to
plan at both political and operational levels for the war as they had under estimated
the Viet Minh. Subsequently the French realized the determination of the
Nationalists and the guerrilla tactics they adopted. This made the French
Commanders to consider detailed planning which included the use of paratroopers
to cut-off the VM as the case was towards the final battle of Dien Bien.
11. In
May 1953, French Premier René Mayer appointed Henri Navarre, a trusted
colleague, to take command of French Union Forces in Indochina. Mayer had given
Navarre a single order to create military conditions that would lead to an
"honorable political solution".
According to military scholar Phillip Davidson, on arrival,
Navarre was shocked by what he found. There had been no long-range plan since
de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day reactive basis.
Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy moves or threats.
There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization and build up the
equipment of the French force. Therefore, lack of initial focus and late
planning eventually cost the French a war.
CHAPTER TWO
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN
12. The Indochina War was not one but a series
of campaigns over the years. The major campaigns are discussed below.
13. Campaign of 1946. Fighting
broke out in Haiphong after a conflict of interest in
import duty at the port between the Viet Minh government and the French. On November 23, 1946 the French fleet began a
naval bombardment of the city that killed over 6,000 Vietnamese civilians in
one afternoon. The Việt Minh quickly agreed to a cease-fire and left the
cities. There was never any intention among the Vietnamese to give up, as
General Vo Nguyen Giap soon brought up 30,000 men to
attack the city. Although the French were outnumbered, their superior weaponry
and naval support made any Việt Minh attack impossible.
14. Campaign of 1947. In 1947, General Võ Nguyên Giap moved his command to Tân Trào. The French sent military
expeditions to attack his bases, but Giáp refused to meet them head-on in
battle. Wherever the French troops went, the Viet Minh disappeared. Later in
the year the French launched Operation Lea to take out the Việt Minh
communications center at Bac Kan. They failed to capture Hồ Chi Minh and his
key lieutenants as intended, but 9,000 Việt Minh soldiers were killed during
the campaign which was a major blow for the insurgency.
15. Campaign of 1948. In 1948, France started looking for means of opposing the
Việt Minh politically, with an alternative government in Saigon. They began negotiations with the
former Vietnamese Emperor Bảo Đại to lead an "autonomous"
government within the French Union of nations, the State of Vietnam. Two years before, the French had
refused Hồ's proposal of a similar status.
16. Campaign of 1949. By 1949, the United States begun giving military aid to France, in the
form of weaponry and military observers. By then with almost unlimited Chinese
military supplies entering Vietnam, General Giáp re-organized his local
irregular forces into five full conventional infantry divisions, the 304th, 308th, 312th,
316th and the 320th. The war begun to intensify when Giáp went on the
offensive, attacking isolated French bases along the Chinese border.
17. Campaign of 1950. In February 1950, Giáp seized the vulnerable 150-strong
French garrison at Lai Khe in Tonkin just south of the border
with China. Then, on May 25, he attacked the garrison of Cao Bang manned by 4,000 French-controlled
Vietnamese troops, but his forces were repulsed. Giáp launched his second
offense again against Cao Bang as well as Dong Khe on September 15. Dong Khe fell on September 18, and Cao
Bang finally fell on October 3. Lang Son, with its 4,000-strong French Foreign Legion garrison, was attacked immediately
after. The retreating French on Route 4, together with the relief force
coming from That Khe, were attacked all the way by
ambushing Việt Minh forces. The French air-dropped a paratroop battalion south
of Dong Khe to act as diversion only to see it surrounded and destroyed. On
October 17, Lang Son, after a week of intense fighting, finally fell. By the
time the remains of the garrisons reached the safety of the Red River Delta, 4,800 French troops had been
killed, captured or missing in action and 2,000 wounded out of a total garrison
force of over 10,000. Also lost were 13 artillery pieces, 125 mortars, 450
trucks, 940 machine guns, 1,200 submachine guns and 8,000 rifles destroyed or
captured during the fighting. China and the Soviet Union recognized Hồ Chí Minh
as the legitimate ruler of Vietnam and sent him more and more supplies and
material aid. The year 1950 also marked the first time that napalm was ever used in Vietnam this type
of weapon was supplied by the U.S. for the use of the French Aeron vale at the
time. The military situation improved for France when their new commander,
General Jean Marie de Lattre de Tassigny, built a fortified line from Hanoi to the Gulf of Tonkin, across the Red River Delta, to hold the Việt Minh in
place and use his troops to smash them against this barricade, which became
known as the "De Lattre Line". This led to a period of
success for the French.
18. Campaign of 1951. On January 13, 1951, Giap moved the 308th and 312th Divisions,
made up of over 20,000 men to attack Vinh Yen, 20 miles (32 km) northwest of
Hanoi which was manned by the 6,000 strong 9th Foreign Legion Brigade. The Việt
Minh entered a trap. Caught for the first time in the open and actually forced
to fight the French head-on, without the ability to quickly hide and retreat,
they were mowed down by concentrated French artillery and machine gun fire. By
January 16, Giap was forced to withdraw; having lost over 6,000 killed, 8,000
wounded and 500 captured. The Battle of Vinh Yen had been a catastrophe. On March
23, Gen Giap tried again, launching an attack against Mao
Khe, 20 miles
(32 km) north of Haiphong. The 316th Division, composed of
11,000 men, with the partly rebuilt 308th and 312th Divisions in reserve, went
forward and were beaten in bitter hand-to-hand fighting against French troops.
Giap, having lost over 3,000 dead and wounded by March 28, withdrew.
19. Gen
Giap launched yet another attack on May 29 with the 304th Division at Phu Ly, the 308th Division at Ninh Binh, and the main attack delivered by
the 320th Division at Phat Diem south of Hanoi. The attacks fared
no better and the three divisions lost heavily. Taking advantage of this, de
Lattre mounted his counter offensive against the demoralized Việt Minh, driving
them back into the jungle and eliminating the enemy pockets in the Red River
Delta by June 18 costing the Việt Minh over 10,000 killed. Every
effort by Vo Nguyen Giap to break the line failed and every attack he made was
answered by a French counter-attack that destroyed his forces. Việt Minh
casualties rose alarmingly during this period, leading some to question the
leadership of the Communist government, even within the party. However, any
benefit this may have reaped for France was negated by the increasing domestic
opposition to the war in France. On November 14, 1951, the French seized Hòa Bình, 25 miles (40 km) west of the
De Lattre line, by a parachute drop and expanded their perimeter.
20. Campaign
of 1952. Việt Minh launched attacks on Hòa
Binh forcing the French to withdraw back to their main positions on the De
Lattre line by February 22, 1952. Each side lost nearly 5,000 men in this
campaign and it showed that the war was far from over. Within that year, throughout
the war theatre, the Việt Minh cut French supply lines and began to seriously
wear down the resolve of the French forces. There were continued raids,
skirmishes and guerrilla attacks, but through most of the rest of the year each
side withdrew to prepare itself for larger operations. On October 17, 1952,
Giáp launched attacks against the French garrisons along Nghia Lo, northwest of Hanoi, and overran
much of the Black River valley, except for the airfield of Na San where a
strong French garrison was entrenched. The only major fighting during the
operation came during the withdrawal, when the Việt Minh ambushed the French
column at Chan Muong on November 17. The road was
cleared after a bayonet charge by the Indochinese March Battalion and the
withdrawal could continue. Though the operation was partially successful, it
proved that although the French could strike out at any target outside the De
Lattre line, it failed to divert the Việt Minh offensive or seriously damage
its logistical network.
21. Campaign of 1953. On April 9, 1953, Giáp, after having
failed repeatedly in direct attacks on French positions in Vietnam, changed
strategy and began to pressure the French by invading Laos, surrounding areas and defeating
several French outposts such as Muong Khoua. The only real change came in May when General Navarre replaced General Salan as supreme commander in Indochina.
He reported to the government "…that there was no possibility of winning
the war in Indo-China" saying that the best the French could hope for was
a stalemate. Navarre, in response to the Việt Minh attacking Laos, concluded
that "hedgehog" centers of defense were the best plan. Looking at a
map of the area, Navarre chose the small town of Ðiện Biên Phủ, located about 10 miles
(16 km) north of the Lao border and 175 miles (282 km) west of Hanoi
as a target to block the Việt Minh from invading Laos. Ðiện Biên Phủ offered a
number of advantages; it was on a Việt Minh supply route into Laos on the Nam Yum River, it had an old airstrip for supply
and it was situated in the T'ai hills where the T'ai tribesmen,
still loyal to the French, operated. Operation Castor was launched on November 20, 1953
with 1,800 men of the French 1st and 2nd Airborne Battalions dropping into the
valley of Ðiện Biên Phủ and sweeping aside the local Việt Minh garrison. The
paratroopers gained control of a heart-shaped valley 12 miles (19 km) long
and eight miles (13 km) wide surrounded by heavily wooded hills. Encountering
little opposition, the French and T'ai units operating from Lai Châu to the north patrolled the hills.
The operation was a tactical success for the French. However, Giáp, seeing the
weakness of the French position, started moving most of his forces from the De
Lattre line to Ðiện Biên Phủ. By mid-December, most of the French and T'ai
patrols in the hills around the town were wiped out by Việt Minh ambushes.
The fight for control of this position would be the longest and hardest
battle for the CEFEO and would be remembered by the veterans as "57 Days
of Hell".
22. Campaign
of 1954. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu occurred in 1954 between Viet Minh forces under Vo Nguyen Giap supported by China and the Soviet
Union, and the CEFEO supported by Indochinese allies. The battle was fought
near the village of Dien Bien Phu in northern Vietnam and became the
last major battle between the French and the Vietnamese in the First Indochina
War. The battle began on March 13 when preemptive Việt Minh attack surprised
the French with heavy artillery. Their supply lines interrupted, the French
position became untenable, particularly when the advent of the monsoon season made dropping supplies and
reinforcements by parachute difficult. With defeat imminent, the French sought
to hold on till the opening of the Geneva peace meeting on April 26.
23. The
Stroke of Death. May
1st, Labour Day, and an important Communist holiday, was the beginning of the
final push by the Viet Minh. The roar of attacking guns, and the swooshing,
smashing sounds of the Katyusha rockets deafened the defenders. Close behind
the artillery, swarms of Communist soldiers ran against French bunkers and
strongholds. Wave after wave was beaten back, often in the heat of close
combat. Men used their hands as weapons, striking, clawing and cursing. Couples
lay together in an embrace of death. The smoke was insufferable, and still they
came. There was no end to them. One assault was beaten back, and then another
leaped over the dead bodies to attack again. Frantically the French considered
Operation "Albatross", a plan to break out of the fortress and head
away. The East was untenable, and radio communications informed them that
dozens of new trenches had appeared in the West. The defenders had neither the
strength nor the numbers to effect an escape. The attacks continued day and
night. By May 7th, De Castries saw that it was now utterly hopeless. He ordered
all firing stopped at 1730, and informed Communist General Giap of his
decision. Around the headquarters, the soldiers carried out the orders of their
commander, and destroyed what weapons and ammunition that remained.
24. The Việt Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu
heavily influenced the outcome of the 1954 Geneva accord that took place on July 21. In
August, the Operation Passage to Freedom begun consisting of the evacuation
of Catholic and loyalist Vietnamese civilians from communist North Vietnamese
persecution.
COMMAND
AND CONTROL
25. By
1953, the First Indochina War was not going well for France. A succession
of commanders — Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque, Jean-Étienne Valluy, Roger Blaizot, Marcel Carpentier, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and Raoul Salan—had proven
incapable of suppressing the Viet Minh insurrection. The French were unable to
slow the Viet Minh advance, and the Viet Minh fell back only after outrunning
their always-tenuous supply lines. In May 1953, French Premier René Mayer appointed Henri Navarre, a trusted
colleague, to take command of French Union Forces in Indochina. Mayer had given
Navarre a single order—to create military conditions that would lead to an
"honorable political solution".
26. According
to military scholar Phillip Davidson,
on arrival, Navarre was shocked by what he found. There had been no long-range
plan since de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day,
reactive basis. Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy
moves or threats. There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization
and build up the equipment of the Expeditionary force. Finally, Navarre, the
intellectual, the cold and professional soldier, was shocked by the
"school's out" attitude of Salan and his senior commanders and staff
officers. They were going home, not as victors or heroes, but then, not as
clear losers either. To them the important thing was that they were getting out
of Indochina with their reputations frayed, but intact. They gave little
thought to, or concern for, the problems of their successors.
27. It was now realized that some
drastic, decisive action was necessary or an enemy that refused to quit was
slowly but surely bleeding them to death. General Henri Navarre, now in his
55th year, took the reins of the fighting in Indochina. He served in the
intelligence arm of the resistance and later took command of a Spahi Regiment
chasing Germany out of France. He also participated in the invasion of Germany
and gained fame with his triumph in the fighting at Karlsruhe. Navarre would be
flanked by experienced commanders. They included Major General Rene Cogny, his
deputy commander, and his “golden boy” Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand de la
Croix de Castries. It would later be de Castries' mission to head up the forces
at Dien Bien Phu. Other commanders with varying degrees of combat capabilities
also came to the light. One was Maurice “Bruno” Bigeard. He never had visions
of military service, but was a deadly foe as a saboteur against the Germans. He
accepted a commission and later was involved in the training of Montagnards and
commanding paratroopers. To the men, he was the “l’esprit para.” He enjoyed a
special charisma with his men, and almost never carried a weapon, relying upon
those who served under him to do their job.
28. Other spectacular French commanders
included Pierre Langlais, a daredevil of a fighter and in his third tour in
Vietnam. Finally, one-armed Brigadier General Charles Piroth, who had lost his
limb in fighting in WW II, was purported to be the best artillery commander in
the French army. He would command the guns at Dien Bien Phu. Four
quad-fifties were also set up at strategic points of fire. They had gained fame
in neutralizing the Chinese human wave attacks in Korea. All artillery was the
charge of Colonel Piroth, the deputy commander of Dien Bien Phu. When offered
even more artillery, he arrogantly stated that he already had more artillery
than he needed!
29. The
French government failed to grasp the seriousness of the developing situation.
The military and the politicians continually underestimated the Viet Minh, and
took the task of defeating them half-heartedly. Unrest in Algeria and political
upheaval in France itself caused the struggle in Indochina to take a lesser
place of importance in the list of commitments.
30. On
the VM side, the communist General Vo Nguyen Giap was forced now to bring in reinforcements
from all over Indochina. His attackers had been so depleted from French
resistance that he had to scrounge from every corner of the country. Many spoke
disparagingly of Giap, saying that he was "a non-commissioned officer
learning to lead regiments." what he lacked in skill he made up for in
determination.
TACTICS AND STRATEGY
VM’s strategy and Tactics
31. The Indochina war is a critical example of
conventional versus unconventional tactics and operational strategies being
employed by both sides. The tactics used by the VM can be roughly grouped into
Sabotage, Traps, Terrorism, Camouflage and Ambushes.
(1) Road Cutting.
The classic touches de piano (piano keys) and nids de poule
(potholes) patterns of road sabotage were trademarks of VM activity during the
Indochina War.
(2) Other tactics in this
area were bridge demolition and mining of roads. Ambushes were frequently
"triggered" by minefields (see below). Roadblocks could be made from
railway track or logs placed across the road, and possibly mined/booby-trapped.
(3) Damage to Vehicles and Aircraft. Another tactic aimed at unnerving/disrupting
the French, a typical attack on an airfield would consist of an initial night
attack on the aircraft, attempting to destroy these by fire or explosive.
Whether this was successful or not, the French guard on the aircraft would be
increased. The VM would then wait a few days and carry out sabotage on the
airbase vehicles (removing components, or again using fire or explosives to
destroy them). By attacking relatively unguarded items, and varying the targets,
the maximum disruption to the French could be gained by the minimum VM effort.
b. Traps. The
VM made wide use of booby-traps to slow or halt French movement. There were
various types of trap in use, including:
(1) "Home-made" Mines and Bombs. The Vietnamese guerrillas made use of dud
shells and captured munitions to make ad-hoc explosive charges, "Bangalore
Torpedoes" (tubes of bamboo filled with gunpowder and inserted into barbed
wire or other barricades - when ignited these would clear a path through which
troops could pass), mines, bombs, etc. These could be rigged to trip-wires
across paths, or attached to roadblocks. Sometime they used dummies.
(2) Pungi Sticks. The famous trap from the "Vietnam
War" was in widespread use during this earlier conflict. A simple device
with steel or bamboo spikes attached to wooden boards. Pungi were commonly smeared with excrement or
other noxious material to infect the wounds which they caused.
(3 Grenade Traps. Particularly in villages, in doorways,
rice-caches, etc there were grenades poised with the pin removed, and the lever
wedged down. If this was disturbed, the grenade exploded.
(4) Deadfalls, Cross-bow Traps and other
jungle devices. Traps originally designed for hunting animals were
successfully used against the French. Tree branches could be pulled back under
tension and held in place, with spikes attached, with a release mechanism
triggered by a trip-wire. The branch would then snap back into place, impaling
a soldier on the spikes.
(5) Pit
Traps. Pits were laid with pungi at the base,
and lightly covered with branches or vegetation - the depth of the pit gave
force to the blow when the pungi were contacted. A nastier version still had
the pungi attached to hinged boards overlying the pit - when the board was
trodden on, the foot descended into the pit and the pungi sprang into the
calves and ankles. It was then difficult to remove the foot from the pit and
pungi.
(1) Bombings. Bars, restaurants, cafés, cinemas, brothels and
other known haunts of off-duty Corps
Expéditionnaire Français en Extrême-Orient (CEFEO) troops were all targets for VM bombs. These attacks
had a two-fold effect. First, there was a good chance of killing or injuring
French troops, and secondly it prevented the French from having
"safe" Rest and Recuperation areas. This would have significant
effects on troop morale in the CEFEO.
(2) Attacks on Civilian Targets. The famous "night belongs to
Charlie" comment from the Second Indochina War was just as true in this
conflict. The French military had great trouble in protecting the
"friendly" civilian population.. The villages were rarely garrisoned,
which meant that any headman who was friendly to the French could expect
reprisals from the VM at some point. It was in any village's interest to be
neutral at best, which in turn gave an impression of civilian collaboration
with the VM to the French military - this lead to French raids on villages to
search out caches and VM troops, which raised civilian hostility to the French.
d. Camouflage. Like the Soviet principle of maskhirova, the VM took
great pains to hide their troop concentrations, movements and positions. The
French Airforce had great trouble in locating and interdicting supply lines
when these were columns of porters on jungle or hill paths, decked with local
vegetation. Similarly, the ground troops were constantly surprised by the
number of VM troops who could appear from individual holes or tunnel systems.
Village sweeps could miss units of VM soldiers right under their noses.
The VM developed great tactical and strategic use of tunnels - either as
shelters for troops or caches of arms and other equipment.
e. Ambushes
(1) The VM developed great skill at placing and carrying out
ambushes on French road and river convoys, and even on quite large field units.
The French, because of their reliance upon the road system, were very
susceptible to these ambushes - particularly in rough country where switchback
roads and close terrain could mean that a convoy could only defend itself in a
piecemeal fashion. In a typical ambush on a road column, the VM would
mine and/or block a road as it passed through a wooded valley. Here the
vehicles had no chance to move off-road, and once they became stopped by the
obstacles, the VM troops would begin to fire small arms at the soft vehicles
and personnel, and RCLs or bazookas at AFVs. Mortar and/or artillery fire could
then register on the static targets, and once the vehicles were disabled an
assault by the VM infantry was made to wipe out any survivors. The ambushes did
not always succeed, and on occasion the French managed to extricate themselves
and even inflict heavy losses on the ambushers.
(2) During
the Guerrilla Phase, the VM military gained experience, equipment and
confidence. They rarely attacked strongly-held positions, and avoided
high-intensity combat. Once Giap felt that this phase was complete, the chu luc regulars began to campaign against the
French in open, mobile warfare.
f. The Sanctuary. One point that neither the Americans nor the
French seemed to grasp, was the concept of sanctuary. As long as the
revolutionaries who are fighting a guerilla war have a sanctuary, in which they
can hide out, recoup after losses, and store supplies, it is almost impossible
for any foreign enemy to ever destroy them.
French Strategy
32. The
real problem for the French was that they were a conventional army, trained and
equipped to fight a conventional war. But this was not the case in Indochina.
The VM were an evasive foe. They would appear from nowhere and destroy an
isolated unit, but could never be brought to battle by forces which might
defeat them. There were no obvious bases or other strategic targets, and the
French staff planners had nothing to aim at. Also, with significant French and
friendly Indochinese populations in the towns and cities, the French must keep
garrisons to prevent VM attacks on these civilians. But this meant that the villages
had to be abandoned to the VM. This allowed the VM to move freely at night, and
gave them sources of supply. It also meant that if the villagers were friendly
to the French, then the VM would exact reprisals eventually. In all, this gave
the French at least partial control of the main settlements by day, but little
power in the countryside or by night. Furthermore a spy network was in position
virtually from the start of the conflict. Also, not only Indochinese worked for
the VM - some Europeans did as well.
33. While
the strategy of pushing the VM into attacking a well defended base in a remote
part of the country at the end of their logistical trail was validated at the Battle of Na San,
the lack of construction materials (especially concrete), tanks (because of
lack of road access and difficulty in the jungle terrain), and air cover
precluded an effective defense.
34. The Hedgehog. Starting on October 2, the Battle of Na San saw the first use of the French
commanders "hedgehog" tactics consisting in setting
up a well defended outpost to get the Việt Minh out of the jungle and force it
to fight a conventional battle instead of ambushes. At first this strategy was
successful for the French Union but it ended with a fiasco in 1954. Colonel
Louis Berteil, commander of Mobile Group 7 and Navarre's main planner, formulated
the hérisson ("hedgehog")
concept. The French army would establish a fortified airhead
by air-lifting soldiers adjacent to a key Viet Minh supply line to Laos. This
would effectively cut off Viet Minh soldiers fighting in Laos and force them to
withdraw. "It was an attempt to interdict the enemy's rear area, to stop
the flow of supplies and reinforcements, to establish a redoubt in the enemy's
rear and disrupt his lines". The hedgehog concept was based on French
experiences at the Battle of Na San. Navarre had previously considered three other
ways to defend Laos: mobile warfare,
which was impossible given the terrain in Vietnam; a static defense
line stretching to Laos, which was not executable given the number of troops at
Navarres disposal; or placing troops in the Laotian provincial capitals and
supplying them by air, which was unworkable due to the distance from Hanoi
to Luang Prabang
and Vientiane.
Thus, the only option left to Navarre was the hedgehog, which he characterized
as "a mediocre solution."
35. Airborne Operations. The French
air-dropped a paratroop battalion south of Dong Khe to act as diversion only to
see it surrounded and destroyed. On October 17, Lang Son, after a week of
intense fighting, finally fell.
36. Use
of Air power. The year 1950 also
marked the first time that napalm was ever used in Vietnam (this type
of weapon was supplied by the U.S. for the use of the French Aeronovale at the
time). In
one action, a Hmong partisan, part of the French Special Forces group,
“Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes (GCMA) was armed with a radio and a
direct connection to the French flights above him. Having located a severely
depleted withdrawing Viet Minh battalion, he called in an airstrike that
virtually annihilated those who had survived the earlier fighting. On 5 April,
after a long night of battle, French fighter-bombers and artillery inflicted
particularly devastating losses on one Viet Minh regiment which was caught on
open ground. At that point, Giap decided to change tactics. Although Giap still
had the same objective – to overrun French defenses east of the river – he
decided to employ entrenchment and
sapping to try to achieve it.
37. Diversionary
Attack. The French applied this tactic. The French air-dropped a
paratroop battalion south of Dong Khe to act as diversion only to see it
surrounded and destroyed.
38. Employment of Special Forces. In
the 1950s, the French established secret commando groups based on loyal montagnard ethnic minorities referred as "partisans" or "maquisards", called the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (Composite Airborne
Commando Group or GCMA). This commando unit wore Việt Minh black uniforms to
confuse the enemy and used techniques of the experienced Bo doi (Bộ đội,
regular army) and Du Kich (guerrilla unit).
The commando was awarded the Croix de guerre des TOE wit.
PRINCIPLES APPLIED
VM Principles
39. Vo Nguyen Giap was the mastermind behind
the VM military effort, and he laid down principles underlying VM actions,
based on Maoist doctrine. Giap fully understood the works and writings of Mao,
Trotsky, Sun Tzu - and was able to create his own methods without slavishly
following these guides. As Ho Chi Minh said of the struggle for Vietnamese
independence:
"It is the fight between tiger
and elephant. If the tiger stands his ground, the elephant will crush him with
its mass. But, if he conserves his mobility, he will finally vanquish the
elephant, who bleeds from a multitude of cuts."
40. Giap, following Mao, developed the
principle of three stages to the struggle:
a. First, the
movement must establish strong bases in country where the enemy cannot easily
attack them. Here they can train their soldiers, and build political strength
amongst the surrounding villages. It also gives the military a supply base and
headquarters, and somewhere to fall back on in difficult times.
b. Secondly, a
period of guerrilla activity and political campaigning. The guerrillas will
make pinprick attacks in the enemy rear, forcing him to disperse his forces and
making his troops' morale drop. When the enemy becomes frustrated and makes
reprisals, then the movement gains political strength from this. The less
control which the enemy is seen to have over the country, the more that the
people will look to the VM for support and guidance. If the enemy presses hard
on the guerrilla forces, they should avoid contact and only fight when they
have a clear advantage.
c. Thirdly, when
the enemy is weakened and the people are behind the VM, it is time to engage in
open warfare. Again, every victory by the VM brings political capital. VM
failures should be ruthlessly abandoned, so that the enemy can take little advantage
from them. Eventually he will be forced to retire from the country.
41. That, in essence, is the thinking behind
both the First and Second Indochina Wars from a communist/nationalist
perspective. As can be seen, the political and military objectives are one and
the same. It is not land itself that matters, but standing with the people and
hence political power. If the second or third phases are started too early (as
was the case when open warfare was initiated in 1951, and the VM were heavily
defeated at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe and Phat Diem), then the VM just pull back to the
lower level (i.e. to low-level guerrilla warfare, or in extremis back to their
base camps). In the guerrilla phase, VM political agents moved around the
villages teaching and indoctrinating. But the French could rarely discover
these agents who (in the words of Mao) "moved like fish in the sea".
If an area was quiet, was it truly pacified or just reorganising for future
campaigns? It was difficult for the French to know.
42. In Sun Tzu principles it is stated
that "Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will
never be defeated" - this is very true for Ho, Giap and the VM. They had
lived with, and been ruled by, the French - and had seen the French defeated by
the Japanese. They knew their own people, and knew that the French yoke was too
heavy - if they offered something better than many would listen. But the French
seemed ignorant of the true strength of the VM - initially, when they could
have crushed the movement, they took little notice of another group of
"bandits". Then, as things escalated they dreamed up ever wilder
schemes to defeat the VM on a military basis, until finally - when the VM tide
was rolling down on them like a tidal wave - they were forced to back down.
Little or no attempt was ever made by the French administration to fight the VM
on a political level, and this, is where they failed.
43. Intelligence.
With superb intelligence from agents or observation, the VM planned attacks
meticulously. Weak points and important positions were identified, and the
units involved were trained using models or "post-and-string"
mock-ups of the targets.
44. Cover and Concealment. Much use
was made of night-attacks to reduce French effectiveness.
45. Morale. The morale advantage of close-order,
"human wave" assaults was held to be more beneficial than reducing
casualties by dispersal. This doctrine won many successes, but in the 1951
battles the VM played into French hands when such assaults were launched against
positions with well dug-in, determined infantry with tank, artillery and air
support (including napalm).
LOGISTICS
French Logistics
46. The logistics of Indochina War were a
constant research of remedies to situations which were unfavorable and unstable.
The employment of Armies of allied states and their rapid growth also heavily
increased responsibilities because the French had to assume the entire
logistical support system. The irregular demands of the operations and the
frequent modifications due to changing factors and circumstances made it
difficult to operate efficiently due to the following reasons:
a.
The structure had been created to
support troops stationed in Indochina before 1945, and the system could not
support increased troop numbers and changing circumstances.
b.
The distance from France, from where the
war was being directed and which was the source of all essential supplies, was
too far at 12 000 Km.
c.
The particular geography of Indochina,
vast flooded areas, considerable distances and tropical climate.
d.
The number of vehicles to maintain
increased from 15 000 in 1947 to 60 000 in 1954, outstripping servicing
facilities.
e.
The surface necessary for the stocking
of supplies increased from 130 000 m2
in 1947 to 300 000 m2
in 1954, leading to the use of open stockyards due to lack of storage space.
f.
The numbers of casualties increased from
394 000 in 1946 to 714 000 in 1953, putting pressure on limited medical
facilities
g.
Use of mobile forces due to the nature
of operations led to airlifting of logistics requirements, leading to huge
maintenance costs. Indochina was largely underdeveloped, and so, there were no
local sources for materials. The relatively small companies based in SAIGON and
HAHOI could only manage to supply limited quantities of Rice, Cattle, Fish and
Building materials making France the only reliable source for logistical
requirements. Besides, specialized labourers were scarce and it was difficult
to find apprentices to train.
47. It took two months to transport supplies
from France to Indochina, a considerable delay. Other sources including the United
States, Japan and Australia could only manage to supply limited quantities. By
July 1950, Artillery ammunition monthly consumption had increased to 30 000
Shells from the estimated 5 000 shells. This put pressure on both
transportation and budget for the war. By September 1953, the factories
supplying spares ran out of spares for Dodges and Jeeps sending many vehicles
in this category out of service, a major setback to the maintenance of troops.
The war of Indochina was conducted as a successive series of improvisations.
The Services had to change their organizations constantly and, without
sufficient means, they had to face growing duties. Air lifts remained the only way out to
support some areas which were inaccessible by road. A total of 21000 tons was
supplied to DIEN BIEN alone by air in 1953 (of which 5 000 parachute-dropped).
An average of 130 tons per day was being supplied by air in 1954. Other logistical aspects include;
a. Quartermaster operations were made
difficult due to differences of race, and ethnical groups that made up the
forces. For instance, the Muslim troops needed live mutton, obtained in
Australia and North America and transported at great expense.
b. Clothing.
Troops stationed in TONKIN and LAOS
needed special bedding equipment for winter, and procurement of these items
added costs. Quality of clothing was compromised. Due to huge demand, Officers
complained of uniforms poorly cut, poorly adjusted, and difficult to adapt to
the different sizes of men.
c.
Rations.
The food for stationery troops was
satisfactory, while that for operating units was more irregular due to bad
conditions. It was difficult to supply Vegetables and Meat. Troops had to rely
on a monotony of dry rations.
d. Health
Services. The Health Service in
Indochina fulfilled its mission quite well since it can be affirmed that every
wounded soldier who had a chance to survive and reached the operating
facilities was saved. Medical Sections were attached to every unit to provide
medical cover. The forward medical units whose functions were to pick up bodies
and to give first aid worked hard to ensure that all the wounded received
attention.
e. Evacuation. Transporting the wounded up to the point
which the medical personnel could reach was the responsibility of the Battalion
and Company Medics. Evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield was a
serious problem and it was never resolved in a satisfactory manner. In most
areas, the only available evacuation method was by Helicopter due to lack of
good road infrastructure and wet weather conditions. This was more severe in
the region of the Delta, where units were spread out in the Rice paddies,
several kilometers away from any road or waterway.
f. The Expeditionary Corps and the Allied
Armies saw the increase in demand for fuel. The demand rose from 131 000 cubic
meters in 1945 to 356 000 cubic meters in 1950. Fuel Depots were opened up in
all regions and refueling points with all units. The operational Depots had to
be prepared in relatively secure areas. Dispersion and lateral earth banks were
needed for the protection against Arty or mortar shells.
g. Material
Services. Armoured vehicles increased from 15 000 in 1947 to 60 000 in
1954. Both armoured and regular vehicles had a high rate of wear and tear of
transmission and suspension assemblies that required constant supply of spares.
The terrain, climate and poor road network contributed to high maintenance
requirements.
48. Outsider logistical Support. On June 30, 1950, the first U.S. supplies for Indochina were
delivered. In September, Truman sent the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Indochina to assist the
French. Later, in 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower explained the escalation risk, introducing what he referred
to as the "domino principle", which eventually became the concept of Domino theory.
According
to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act,
the United States provided the French with material aid during the
battle – aircraft (supplied by the USS Saipan),
weapons, mechanics, 24 CIA/CAT pilots, and U.S. Air Force
maintenance crews. The United States, however, intentionally avoided overt
direct intervention. On
March 3, 1954, twelve C-119s of the 483rd Troop Carrier Wing ("Packet Rats")
based at Ashiya, Japan, were painted with France's
insignia and loaned to France with 24 CIA pilots for short term use.
Maintenance was carried out by the US Air Force and airlift operations were
commanded by McCarty. Twenty four Central Intelligence Agency (Civil Air Transport) pilots supplied the French Union
garrison during the siege of Dien Bien Phu by airlifting paratroopers,
ammunition, artillery pieces, tons of barbed wire, medics and other military
material. With the reducing Drop zone areas, night operations and
anti-aircraft artillery assaults, many of the "packets" fell into
Việt Minh hands.
Viet Minh Logistics
Aspects
49. Coolies and POWs known as PIM (Prisonniers
Internés Militaires which is basically the same as POW) were civilians used
by the army as logistical support personnel. The Việt Minh used thousands of
coolies to carry the Chu-Luc (regional units) supplies and ammunition during
assaults. The PIM were civilian males old enough to join Bảo Đại's army. They
were captured in enemy controlled villages, and those who refused to join the
State of Vietnam's army were considered prisoners or used as coolies to support
a given regiment. A growing surge of rebellion in the
communist ranks prevented Giap from pursuing his assaults.
50. Ammunition
was low, casualties were high, and medical supplies for the many wounded were
inadequate. Reinforcement and resupply were the top priorities for the
Communist forces, although sporadic attacks and firing continued throughout the
month. The Viet Minh, using 75,000 labor, cut a brand-new, 100 km
trail through the jungle, thus creating a continuous trail between China and
Dien Bien Phu. They built up a major logistics base specifically for the
campaign, 55 miles Northeast of the base. French aircraft attacked the trail at
every opportunity, but the labor worked at night and on days clouds prevented
air sorties, and quickly repaired cuts. The Viet Minh deployed an additional
33,500 labor to supply the siege; among other items, these workers moved 20,584
tons of rice on bicycles, horses, and junks.
51. China
supplied the Viet Minh with hundreds of Soviet-built GAZ-51 trucks in the 1950s. The Soviet Union was the other ally of
the Việt Minh supplying GAZ trucks, truck engines, fuel, tires,
arms (thousands of Skoda light machine guns), all kind of ammunitions,
anti-aircraft guns (4 x 37 mm type) and cigarettes. During Operation
Hirondelle, the French Union paratroopers captured and destroyed tons of Soviet
supply in the Ky Lua area. According to General Giap, the Viet Minh used 400 GAZ-51 soviet-built trucks at the battle of Dien Bien.
POLITICAL ASPECTS
52. Initially confident of victory, the French
long ignored the real political cause of the war—the desire of the Vietnamese
people, including their anticommunist leaders, to achieve unity and
independence for their country. French efforts to deal with those issues were
devious and ineffective. In September 1945, de Gaulle chose an Admiral,
Georges Thierry d‟Argenlieu,
to serve as his new high commissioner for Indochina, ordering him to retake and
to re-establish French sovereignty over all of Indochina in the form of an
eventual Indochinese Federation. Like de Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh had also created a
nationalist front during WW II. It was located just outside Japanese-controlled
Indochina and was designed to prepare the recovery of Vietnamese national
sovereignty once the Allies had defeated the Japanese as they had done for de
Gaulle by defeating the Germans in Europe
53. In 1948, France started looking for means
of opposing the Việt Minh politically, with an alternative government in Saigon. They began negotiations with the
former Vietnamese emperor Bảo Đại to lead an "autonomous"
government within the French Union of nations, the State of Vietnam. Two years before, the French had
refused Hồ's proposal of a similar status (albeit with some restrictions on
French power and the latter's eventual withdrawal from Vietnam); however, they
were willing to give it to Bảo Ðại as he had freely collaborated with French
rule of Vietnam in the past and was in no position to seriously negotiate or
impose demands (Bảo Ðại had no military of his own, but soon he would have
one).
54. French
political leaders, above all Léon Pignon, regretted that the French now found
themselves face-to-face with the DRV, increasingly dominated by communists.
With the Indochinese Federation already in trouble by late 1946, Pignon
understood that the French would have to work with non-communist Vietnamese
nationalists to hold on colonially. As early as January 1947, he had advised
his superiors secretly that the French war with the DRV had to “be transposed”
to a Vietnamese playing field, using the Viet Minh’s adversaries to do the
fighting. The French turned to the former Emperor Bao Dai, now living in exile
in China and apparently unhappy with the DRV, in order to build a
counter-revolutionary state, around which non-communist nationalists would
rally. This was the third time, not the first time, that French politicians
turned to Bao Dai to find a solution to their political problems in Indochina.
55. In 1949, France officially recognized the
"independence" of the State of Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union under Bảo Ðại. However, France
still controlled all foreign relations and every defense issue as Vietnam was
only nominally an independent state within the French
Union
. The Việt Minh quickly denounced the government and stated that they wanted
"real independence, not Bảo Ðại independence". Later on, as a
concession to this new government and a way to increase their numbers, France
agreed to the formation of the Vietnamese National Army to be commanded by Vietnamese
officers. These troops were used mostly to garrison quiet sectors so French
forces would be available for combat. The Vietnamese Communists in return
obtained outside support in 1949 when Chairman Mao
Zedong
succeeded in taking control of China by defeating the Kuomintang, thus gaining a major political
ally and supply area just across the border. In the same year, the French also
granted independence (within the framework of the French Union) to the other two nations in Indochina, the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The United States recognized the
South Vietnamese state, but many other nations viewed it as simply a French
puppet regime and would not deal with it at all.
56. Then the U.S. government gradually began
supporting the French in their war effort, primarily through Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as a means of stabilizing the French Fourth Republic in which the French Communist Party was a significant political force.
A dramatic shift occurred in American policy after the victory of Mao Zedong's Communist Party of China in the Chinese Civil War. By 1949, however, the United
States became concerned about the spread of communism in Asia, particularly
following the end of the Chinese Civil War, and began to strongly support the
French as the two countries were bound by the Cold War Mutual Defense
Programme.
57. Geneva
Conference. The Việt Minh
victory at Dien Bien Phu heavily influenced the outcome of the 1954 Geneva accords that took place on July 21. In
August began Operation Passage to Freedom consisting of the evacuation of
Catholic and loyalist Vietnamese civilians from communist North Vietnamese
persecution. Negotiations between France and the Việt Minh started in Geneva in
April 1954 at the Geneva Conference, during which time the French Union
and the Việt Minh were fighting a battle at Dien Bien Phu. In France, Pierre Mendès-France, opponent of the war since 1950,
had been invested as Prime Minister on June 17, 1954, on a promise to put an
end to the war, reaching a ceasefire in four months. The internationally
imposed division of Indochina at the 16th parallel remains the best example of
how global events impinged on colonial and national ones, essential to
understanding the complex events of 1945-47 in Indochina if not well beyond.
For one, Chinese officers blocked the French return to northern Indochina until
the Franco-Chinese accord of 28 February 1946 allowed the French to begin
replacing Chinese troops north of the 16th parallel. In exchange, however, the
French had to give up many of their colonial concessions in China and accord
special privileges to the overseas Chinese living in Indochina.
EFFECTS AND IMPACT
58. Refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The war resulted in several refugees and
IDPs. During Operation Passage to Freedom in 1954 a number of refugees and
IDPs were repatriated back into and out Vietnam. Operation Passage to Freedom was a Franco-American operation to
evacuate refugees.
59. Independence
and Creation of states.
The First Indochina War Resulted
In: Vietnamese Communist victory, division of Vietnam into the Communist
North and non-Communist south, independence of Laos and Cambodia.
The Geneva Conference
opened on 8 May 1954, the day after the surrender of the French. Ho
Chi Minh entered the conference on the opening day with the news of his troops'
victory in the headlines. The resulting agreement temporarily partitioned
Vietnam into two zones: the North was administered by the communist
Democratic Republic
of Vietnam while the South was administered by the
French-supported State of Vietnam
60. War crimes & re-education camps. Georges Boudarel was a French communist militant who
used brainwashing and torture against French Union POWs in VM re-education
camps (The Boudarel Affair). The French national association of
POWs brought Boudarel to court for a war crime charge. Most of the French Union
prisoners died in the VM camps and many POWs from the Vietnamese National Army went missing.
61. Casualties. First
Indochina War had Casualties as follows:
a. French
forces: 75,581 dead, 64,127 wounded, 40,000 captured.
b Communist
Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Khmer Issarak forces: 300,000+ dead, 500,000+
wounded, 100,000+ captured.
c. Civilians:
Over 150,000 civilians killed.
62. Cold
War Politics. Escalation of the Cold War Politics due to communist
victory which later saw the emergence of second Indochina War commonly said to
be the fight against communist expansion.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM INDO CHINA WAR.
63. Coalitions and Outside Support.
Coalitions and Outside Support will always play a major part in any
conflict. The United States and Great Britain supported the French side, while
the Soviet Union and China supported the VM with equipment and training. After
the Communist victory in China in 1949, the Vietnamese were allowed the use of
southern China as a staging point for attacks into northern Vietnam.
64. Use
of Propaganda. Propaganda is
vital in any campaign and has a major impact at the end, especially by use of
the media. In the Indochina War propaganda leaflets written in Tai and French
sent by the VM were found in the deserted positions and trenches. These played
an important part in winning the heart and minds of the population.
65. Employment
of Guerilla Tactics. For a weaker force to defeat a stronger
force, the weaker should avoid fighting in the open until they build up forces
to be able to fight conventional. This was evident in that the French usually proved too strong
when the Viet Minh unwisely chose to fight in open battle rather than adhering
to guerrilla tactics. Such a battle occurred in January 1951, when General Giap
decided to make a major strike at Hanoi and chose to attack the French at Vinh
Yen, 65 kilometers northwest of the city. Ultimately the Viet Minh learnt they
could not defeat the French in open battle and returned to their successful
guerrilla tactics, until the great disaster of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 ended the
French campaign.
66. It
is clear that wars of decolonization almost always spawn civil violence if not
revolution at some level as different groups vie for control over the
postcolonial state and its ideological nature. The Indochinese War was no
exception. The civil war was most prominent in eastern Indochina, where
communism had divided Vietnamese nationalists since the 1920s.
67. Adherence to the International Humanitarian
Law. For instance Franco-Vietnamese
medics treated a wounded VM POW at Hung Yen (1954). This was later hailed by
the International Red Cross Society.
68. Other Lessons. It is also clear that the French were
defeated by the Viet Minh, and it is usual to attribute this to several factors
such as poor support for the war from France, an overstretched CEFEO, supplies
of equipment from Communist China and Russia to the VMs and the impossibility
of fighting an elusive opponent in difficult terrain. The following factors can
be concluded to be important for success in any campaign.
a. National
support.
b. Distances
of logistical supplies.
c. Understanding
and knowing yourself and your enemy.
d. Terrain.
CONCLUSION
69. Like
so many others of the 20th century, the Indochina War was not one war, but
several. It was a colonial and civil conflict, a hotspot in the Cold War, as
well as a social, cultural, intellectual, ideological, and economic battle for
many. The conflict not only divided the French and the Vietnamese, but it also
affected the Lao, Cambodians, and ethnic minorities and involved the Chinese,
British, Soviets, Thais, Japanese, and Americans.
70. At the outset, it was above all a clash
between opposing French and Vietnamese nationalist projects over who would
control the Indochinese space left blank after the Japanese brought down
colonial house in Indochina in March 1945 and were then defeated a few months
later.
71. While it is not sure that any conflict can
technically be labeled a “total war” the Indochina War came close in the
non-Western context. The conflict
allowed the party, as in communist China, to increase its control over the
state, army, and civilian populations living in its territories. All of these “revolutionary” structures and
techniques would serve the DRV well when war, both civil and international,
resumed only a few years after the signing of the Geneva Accords. In short, war
destroys but it also creates. It closes certain historical avenues and opens
new ones. The Indochina War was no exception.
72. The First
Indochina War also involved: The
United States and Great Britain supporting the French side, while the Soviet
Union and China supported the rebels with equipment and training. After the
Communist victory in China in 1949, the Vietnamese rebels were allowed the use
of southern China as a staging point for attacks into northern Vietnam. The War resulted in Vietnamese
Communist victory, division of Vietnam into the Communist North and
non-Communist South, independence of Laos and Cambodia.
REFERENCES
C. DeBenedetti and C. Chatfield, An
American Ordeal: Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (1990).
Christopher
E. Goscha The Indochina War: A Connected History Mao Zedong, Problems of War and Strategy (November
6, 1938).
Christopher E. Goscha, Dictionary of the Indochina
War: International and Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Honolulu, University of
Hawaii Press, à paraître en 2011.
Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus
Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era (1994)
Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam
War, 1945-1990 (1991)
Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacoutre, End of a war; Indochina, 1954 (1969)
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A
History (1983)
Stein Tonnesson, ‘The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-1975, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22,
No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 9-29
Tom Wells, The war within:
America’s battle over Vietnam (1994)
Wallace Terry, Bloods: an oral
history of the Vietnam War/by black veterans (1984)
Walter Capps (ed.), The Vietnam
Reader (1990)
INTERNET
SOURCES
By Maj Davies Saina Kalepa MCIPS MZIPS - DSCSC Lusaka Zambia 2012
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