SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH
PAPER
IMPACT
OF PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
BY
MAJOR
DAVIES SAINA KALEPA
DIPLOMA
IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES
The University of Zambia
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES
DSS
105: RESEARCH PAPER
Name:
Davies Saina Kalepa
Programme: Diploma in Defence and Security Studies
Course: DSS 105
Lecturer: Prof BJ Phiri PhD
Subject: Impact of Public Sector
Corruption on Economy
Computer
No: 12151173
Due
Date: 07 November 2012
RESEARCH
PAPER
THE
CHALLENGES AND IMPACT OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FUFILLIMENT
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DIPLOMA IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES BY THE UNIVERSITY
OF ZAMBIA
SUBMISSION
STATEMENT
This
Paper is submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of the ‘Diploma in Defence
and Security’ awarded by the University of Zambia, Lusaka Zambia.
DECLARATION
This
research was done through a high degree of consultation and analysis of
available literature and internet sources, which have all otherwise been
referenced. I therefore, declare that every effort was made to avoid plagiarism
towards other authors’ written works.
Signature:
…………………………………………………………………..
Date:
………………………………………………………………………..
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special
appreciation goes to Prof BJ Phiri PhD, for his guidance throughout the
research. Special thanks go to the management at Drug Enforcement Commission, Anti-Corruption
Commission, Transparency International Zambia, Office of the Auditor General
and various organisations that provided me with required information to
complete this research; and all those individuals that contributed in one way
or another towards the outcome of this research.
CONTENTS
Page
Submission Statement …..………………………………………………………………………i
Declaration …………………………………………………………………………….………..ii
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………….………….iii
Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………………….………….vi
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………….………...vi
Chapter
One……………………………………………………………………………………1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….1
Background……………………………………………………………………………………...2
Statement of the Problem………………………………………………………………………..5
Objectives………………………………………………………………………………………..5
Justification………………………………………………………………………...……………6
Limitations of the Study……………………………………………………………...…………7
Definitions…………………………………………………………………………..…………..7
Methodology………………………………………………………………………...…………..8
Research Questions……………………………………………………………...………………8
Sample Size……………………………………………………………………………...………9
Chapter
Two………………………………………………………………………...………...10
Literature Review……………………………………………………………...……………..10
Chapter
Three………………………………………………………………...……………….15
Findings……………………………………………………………………...…………………15
The Civil
Service…………………………………………………………...…………………...15
Procurement of Goods and
Services…………………………………………………………..16
Gaps in the
Judiciary……………………………………………………………………...…..16
Forms of
Corruption…………………………………………………………………………..17
Policy and
Practice……………………………………………………………………………17
Tangible Costs of
Corruption…………………………………………………………………18
Distortion of Public Assets
Value…………………………………………………………….18
Patronage and Nepotism....……………………………………………………………………18
Main Actors…………………………….……………………………………………………..19
Strategies Used in Fighting
Corruption……………………………………………………….19
Causes of Corruption………………………………………………………………………….19
Chapter
Four………………………………………………………………………………...23
Analysis
of Findings…………………………………………………………………………23
Effects of Corruption on
the Economy……………………………………………………….23
Combating
Corruption………………………………………………… …………………….24
Chapter
Five…………………………………………………………………… …………..26
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………
……………..26
Recommendations……………………………………………………………
……………..28
References
Annex
A (Questionnaire)…………………………………………………… ……………A-1
ABBREVIATIONS
ACC: Anti-Corruption Commission
DEC: Drug Enforcement Commission
ECZ: Electrol
Commission of Zambia
IFMIS: Integrated Financial Management
Information System
IMF: International
Monetary Fund
MMD: Movement for
Multi-Party Democracy
NGO: Non-Governmental
Organisations
OAG: Office of the Auditor General
PEMFA: Public Expenditure Management
and Financial Accountability
SITET: Special Investigation Team on Economy and Trade
TI: Transparency
International
UNDP: United
Nations Development Programme
UNIP: United National Independence Party
ZIPS: Zambia
Institute of Purchasing and Supply
ZPPA: Zambia Public Procurement Authority
ZRA: Zambia
Revanue Authority
ABSTRACT
There had been
many anti-corruption attempts in Zambia targeting the Public Sector, but with
very little success. Despite the many efforts and good laws (such as the
Anti-Corruption Commission Act; Abuse of Authority Clause) meant to fight
corruption, incidences of corruption seemed to be on the increase. Reports of
the Office of the Auditor General continued to reveal high levels of
corruption, and a number of corruption cases were in the courts of law, despite
the many convictions of former public workers during the period 2002 to 2012.
This
research was conducted to establish the relationship between corruption in the
public sector and economic development. The focus of this paper was the impact
of corruption in the public sector on the economic development of Zambia. Whilst
it is difficult to ascertain the exact impact of corruption on development, in
the absence of corruption, even greater and more sustained levels of
development can flourish. Despite arguments to the contrary, all corruption is
inimical to the process of sustainable development.
This
research demonstrated that high scale corruption may have very harmful effects
on economic and political development. There are many causes of corruption, and
is trigged by factors such as monopoly power, discretionary power and weak
accountability of public officials, which may give opportunities for corrupt
acts.
The economic gains from reducing
corruption in can be increased if anti-corruption interventions are combined
with a wider set of policies aimed at improving institutional quality and
providing correct incentives for investment in human capital. This systematic
review also indicates that levels of corruption in the Public Sector may be
higher than in in the Private Sector, but the latter stand to gain more from reducing
the incidence of corruption. With respect to implications for future research,
innovation is both necessary and feasible with respect to construction of
better corruption data, and estimation of indirect effects of corruption in the
public sector on growth.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
There have been
many anti-corruption attempts in Zambia targeting the Public Sector, but with
very little success. Despite the many efforts and good laws (such as the Anti-Corruption
Commission Act) meant to fight corruption, incidences of corruption seemed to
be on the increase. Reports of the Office of the Auditor General have continued
to reveal high levels of corruption, and a number of corruption cases were in the
courts of law at the time this research was conducted, even with the many
convictions of former public workers during the period 2002 to 2012.
At the global
stage, the post Cold War era of the
1990’s saw a renewed interest in corruption fight by Western powers, trying to
bring stability and prosperity to global markets. Nonetheless, research on the
causes and consequences of corruption recorded a significant increase in the
last two decades. According to analysts, countries that undertook liberalisation
reforms in the context of rapid globalisation were most affected.
Literature on
sub-Sahara Africa reveals that many anti-corruption institutions and integrity
systems, although some have had notable success, have not been able to
eliminate or significantly reduce corruption in Africa. However, the picture is
a bit different in Western Countries (North America and Western Europe) where
very low levels of corruption exist due to strong institutions and political
will.
Empirical
evidence suggests that although strong enforcement and monitoring are needed,
they have little long-term effect if the basic conditions that encourage
corruption and payoffs are not addressed. Thus anti-corruption efforts should
focus on making substantial improvements in the overall efficiency, fairness,
and legitimacy of the state, by addressing those underlying incentives to
receive or pay bribes through fundamental reforms.
Zambia’s
socio-economic and political reforms programmes since independence and in
recent times after the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1990 have
consistently recognized the need for institutions of good governance measures.
These measures include accountability and transparency, seeking to reduce the
harmful effects of institutional and legal weaknesses that provide opportunities
for behaviours and practices that can undermine the country’s socio-economic
development through corruption.
These
anti-corruption measures, however, have most often been done in isolation,
uncoordinated, inactionable, and unfavourable manner. Consequently, their
impact on preventing and combating corruption in the country has not been
adequately commensurate with the efforts and fiscal resources involved.
Beginning
with an analysis of the academic perspectives on corruption, this paper
investigated the Zambian Public Sector to establish the impact of corruption on
economic development. The public sector comprises departments that implement
government economic policy, and thus the impact of corruption directly affects
economic factors.
BACKGROUND
Corruption is a contextual
issue and evolves over time. In the case of Zambia, it seemed to have evolved
over four phases and over four decades as the environment underwent clear
patterns of change both in political and economic terms, and gave rise to
corruption.
1964 to 1974.
According to
available literature, this was a period of relatively no corruption, which was
generally rejected or shunned. Soon after independence, nationalism and
patriotism were very strong. The economy was still strong and stable, as world
prices for copper, a leading foreign exchange earner then, were still good.
Generally, unemployment was low, and goods and services were readily available.
It is claimed that during this period the government was efficient in delivering
services, as government machinery largely functioned well; public officers were
adequately remunerated; and employment in public service, promotion, and
discipline in public offices were not based on political considerations or
influenced by irregular means—they were based on merit, and pay structures were
commensurate with responsibility.
The political
leadership was strongly against corruption, and this was supported by a strong
national moral tone against corruption. Public officers observed high ethical
standards of avoiding conflict-of-interest situations, by not engaging in
business deals or arrangements for personal gain. Other than the police, there
was no other organ specifically charged with the responsibility of dealing with
corruption cases.
1975 to 1990.
During this period, the
economy was to a large extent centralized, and the state was in charge of
strategic economic and commercial enterprises. Key industries, factories, and
commercial enterprises were in the hands of the state.
With a narrow
export base on copper, the economy became increasingly vulnerable to changes in
world prices for the commodity. A mounting external debt burden, increasing budget
deficits, and lower GDP growth rates all exerted pressure on the economy and on
inflation rates. Shortages and long queues became common as demand for goods
and services exceeded supply.
It was at this
time that corruption, and concerns about it, began to emerge. However, the
Kaunda government responded by introducing a leadership code, which was
included in the constitution of Zambia and that of UNIP. The code covered all
persons in the employment of UNIP (the only party then), and in the government,
local authorities, trade unions, state enterprises, and institutions of higher
learning. The code barred leaders in many respects, and made earning extra income
while in office illegal, barred public officers from entering into business
arrangements for personal gain, and barred leaders from owning property outside
Zambia or owning more than one piece of land or more than ten acres of land
within Zambia.
All leaders were
required to declare their assets to the committee that oversaw the leadership
code, within three months of assuming office, or whenever they earned extra
income. The leadership committee was appointed by and reported to the
president. Penalties were harsh, and could result in dismissal from office.
Subsequently,
the Special Investigation Team on Economy and Trade (SITET), a forerunner to
the country’s anticorruption commission, was constituted, but it had no meaningful
impact. Because of the ineffectiveness of SITET, the UNIP government in 1980
passed the Corrupt Practices Act to deal specifically with the problem of
mounting corruption. Unlike previous attempts to combat corruption in the past,
the act broadened corruption to include the private sector, and increased
penalties for corruption. The act created the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC),
and gave it the power to investigate and prosecute corruption through the traditional
judiciary.
1991 to 2001.
Chiluba’s ten-year
reign, from 1991 to 2001, is “best remembered” for the worst corruption Zambia
had ever experienced. In the earlier years of the Chiluba regime, the
leadership code was scrapped and public leaders were allowed to own and run businesses
while in office. They were also permitted to earn extra income by whatever
means while in office. Restrictions on property ownership were also removed.
The Parliamentary
and Ministerial Code of Conduct Act was passed in 1994, followed by the
Anti-Corruption Commission Act in 1996, which replaced the Corruption Practices
Act of 1980. Also in 1996, but under pressure from donors and civil society,
the MMD government adopted the Electoral Code of Conduct Regulations, followed
shortly in 2001 by passage of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money
Laundering Act.
While these
efforts seem to indicate political will to combat corruption at the highest
level, the results were dismal. These initiatives were, so it is alleged, merely
to appease the international community. There
was simply no political will to combat corruption.
2002
to 2012.
In 2002, the
government adopted a policy of “Zero Tolerance to Corruption” and the Task
Force on Corruption was established to bring to book and prosecute all those
that were involved in the plunder of national resources in the previous
government. Considerable achievements were made in the fight against
corruptions during this period, with the government receiving international
praise. However, reports indicate that most of these successes were short lived
after the Rupia Banda government (2008 to 2011) removed the Abuse of Authority
Clause from the ACC Act, leading to wide
spread corruption yet again. The Micheal Sata government which took over power
in 2011 promised to strengthen the fight against corruption, and took the Abuse
of Authority Clause back to Parliament for reinstatement in the ACC Act.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
There had
been a lot of efforts directed towards fighting corruption in Zambia. A number
of laws were put in place, and a number of actors both governmental and non-governmental
organisations came forward in order to help fight the scourge. Despite all
these efforts, corruption in the Public Sector was reported to be on the
increase. This research was conducted to find out the impact and effects of
corruption in the public sector on the economy of the country.
OBJECTIVES
General
Objective: To establish
the challenges and Impact of Corruption in the Public Sector on the Economic Development
of Zambia.
Specific Objectives:
1.
To establish the main actors in the
fight against corruption in Zambia.
2.
To review the current strategies in the
fight against corruption in the public sector.
3.
To identify the challenges in the fight
against corruption in Zambia.
4.
To establish the Impact of corruption
in the Public Sector on the Zambian economy.
5.
To recommend measures to help in
effectively fighting corruption in Public Sector.
JUSTIFICATION
The
public sector had the responsibility of implementing government programmes. I
doing so, they were required to account for all resources under their
jurisdiction, and prudently commit all resources as per budget to the benefit
of the nation. If such resources are abused due to corruption in the public
sector, the country will not see the much needed development.
The
Auditor General’s reports continued to review wide spread corruption in the
public sector. This was backed by reports produced by Transparency
International, and corruption related arrests that were being made by the Law
Enforcement Agencies.
A
number Senior Government Officials have been arrested in the past to answer
corruption charges in the recent past, with some cases successfully prosecuted.
Since all government resources are well budgeted for, such abuse implies
inefficiencies, which surely should have an impact and effects on the economic
development of the country. Such corrupt activities needed to be well
investigated to find out the impact on the economy. This would help decision
makers find lasting solutions to reducing corruption for the benefit of the
nation and the future of the country.
The
absence of Corruption will lead to:
1.
Poverty reduction.
2.
Good governance.
3.
Improved citizens’ access to public resources and respect for
human rights.
4.
Effective and efficient government delivery of social services to
the citizens.
5.
Promotion of social-economic and political development.
6.
Economic development in general.
This
paper established the relationship between corruption and development. The
focus was on the impact of public sector corruption on the economy of Zambia.
LIMITATIONS OF THE
STUDY
This
study looked at available information with major actors and reviewed available
literature, and concentrated in Lusaka due to the time factor and financial
implications. All interviews were done within Lusaka, and all questionnaires were
distributed to selected actors in Lusaka. Since most government departments and
NGOs involved in the fight against corruption were headquartered in Lusaka, it
was assumed that the results represented a national character.
The
study focused on the government budgetary expenditure on government projects
and award of contracts in the procurement of goods, works and services. Whereas
activities of government agencies and authorities were investigated, government
aided institutions, State Enterprises and Public Private Partnerships did not
form part of the study.
DEFINITIONS
For
the purpose of this paper, the following words/terms and concepts mean as
indicated:
Corruption: All actions and
activities where the actor(s) gets a personal benefit, which they are otherwise
not entitled to, by taking advantage of their office, position or influence; or
abuse
of public office for private gains by public sector employees.
Public Sector: Includes all government
ministries, agencies, authorities and departments.
Private Sector: Means all enterprises
in which the government has no stake.
Legislation: Acts of Parliament of
the Republic of Zambia or Legal government directives on corruption and related
activities.
Flaws: Weaknesses in the
legislation.
Common citizens: Persons not holding
public offices or working for agencies or organisations involved in the fight
against corruption.
Patronage: The assignment
of government positions to political supporters by legal executive officials.
Nepotism: The granting of public office on the bases of family
ties by individuals in Senior Government positions.
Shared experience: The patron and client
have usually worked together in the past and are on good terms and the patron
promotes or has promoted the client on the basis of these past experience and
warm relationship.
METHODOLOGY
Rather
than examining specific cases of corruption, this research explains the broader
phenomena of the coexistence of development and corruption. The investigation
relied on secondary evidence from reports, face to face interviews and results
of questionnaires.
The
scope of the study took the following form:
1.
Review of available literature on corruption and corrupt
activities.
2.
Collection of information through questionnaires and face to face
interviews with major stakeholders including ACC, DEC, TI, Zambia Police and
Media Organisations.
3.
Obtaining information from randomly selected persons in the
Government Departments, NGOs, and Specialist Consultants.
The
methods of data collection comprised:
1.
Face to face (interviews)
2.
Group interface.
3.
Questionnaire (See Annex A).
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
After studying the current trends and reviewing various
literature on corruption in Zambia, it was clear that there was wide spread
corruption in the public sector. Whereas
the fight was on, questions remained to be answered as to why many more people were
still engaging in the scourge. This research answered the following questions:
1.
Who are the major actors in the
corruption fight in Zambia?
2.
What challenges are there in the fight
against corruption in Zambia?
3.
Why is there wide spread corruption in
the Public Sector?
4.
What is the impact of corruption in the
Public Sector on the economic development of the country?
SAMPLE SIZE
In
order to come up with a balanced report, key stakeholders in the fight against
corruption were contacted, and key persons in such organisations were given
questionnaires to answer, whereas face to face interviews were also conducted
with selected middle management staff to get their views. Target organisations
included the ACC, TI, Lusaka High Court, DEC, Electrol Commission of Zambia,
Zambia Police, Office of the Auditor General, Zambia Institute of Purchasing
and Supply, Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants, Ministry of Justice and
United Nations Development Programme.
Selected
members of the general public and known commentators from academia and NGOs were
also interviewed or given questionnaires for expert opinion.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corruption is
one of the oldest and most perplexing phenomenon in human society. Political corruption
exists in every country in the contemporary world and it is not exclusively a
problem of developing countries. The classical concept of corruption was stated
by ancient political philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Plato in his theory observed
that regimes instead of being guided by the law were serving the interest of
the rulers (Arnold Heidenheimer 1993 p.25). He called political corruption a
consequence of the struggle for power, and that man had been corrupted by
social and political life.
The
definition most frequently used by social scientists is Nye’s, that corruption
is: “…behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of rewards to pervert
the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for
private-regarding uses)” (Nye, J. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost
Benefit Analysis”, The American Political Science Review,
61:2, 1967, p.419). This can be
simplified to a general definition that will be used for the purposes of this
paper: the abuse of public office for private gain.
Prior to
independence, the first law that applied to corruption prevention in Zambia was
the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916. It was cited together with the public
body’s Corrupt Practices Act 1889, and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
In
Post-Independence Zambia, the legal provisions on corruption were first
contained in the Penal Code, Cap 146, Chapter X. This legislation was concerned
with corruption offences by persons employed in the public service, and did not
cover corruption in the private bodies or agents.
In 1973, the
Leadership Code, for leaders, which constituted Part IV of the Republican Constitution,
was introduced. The Leadership Code, First Schedule, Regulation 2, covered all
persons in the service of the party (UNIP), the Government, Local Authorities, Statutory
Corporations including higher Institutions of Learning, any commissions
established by Law, and ZCTU and affiliates. The Code required that persons
covered by it, declare extra income to the leadership committee appointed by
the President. Leaders also had to declare their Assets within three months of
assuming office. They were prohibited from receiving gifts, abusing their office
and were not allowed to use information acquired while in office for private
gain. Failure to comply with the code led to dismissal from office.
The first principle
legislation enacted to combat corruption in the post-independence era, however,
is the Corrupt Practices Act No 14 of 1980. This legislation made corruption an
offence in both the public and private sectors. Further, it provided for
establishment of a separate body, the ACC, and in addition mandated the
Commission to undertake corruption prevention and education programmes.
In 1996, the
Corrupt Practices Act was replaced by the Anti-Corruption Act No 42. This Act
is the main body to combat corruption in Zambia.
In the same
year, the Parliamentary and Ministerial Code of Conduct Act (Chapter 16 of the
Laws of Zambia) was passed to establish a code of conduct for the Vice
President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers. The Act provides that in the event
of the breach of the code, the member concerned shall lose his seat in the
National Assembly.
The Electoral
Commission Act No 24 of 1996 embodies the legal framework for conduct of
elections in Zambia and seeks to curb corruption during the electoral process.
In 2000,
Transparency International rated Zambia among the most corrupt countries in the
world ( Source Book. http://www.transparency.org/sourcebook/11.html).
And in the same year, the United Nations Global Programme Against Corruption
(GPAC) ( Anti-Corruption Tool Kit (CIPP-15), vol. 1. November
2002) observed high corruption levels in Sub Sahara Africa including Zambia.
The
Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act No 14 of 2001 seeks to
provide for the disclosure of information on suspicion of money laundering
activities by supervisory authorities and regulated institutions, the
forfeiture of property by persons convicted of money laundering, local and
international cooperation in investigations, prosecution and other legal
processes of prohibiting and preventing money laundering.
In due recognition of corruption prevention, the government of
Zambia in 2003 set itself on a task of collecting baseline data on corruption
in the country. This endeavor culminated into the National Governance Baseline
Survey Report of August 2004. The report shows that about two thirds of the
respondents considered corruption to be one of the major problems that faced
the country.
Bank of
Zambia Anti-Money Laundering Directives 2004, require a regulated institution
to put in place anti-money laundering measures and adopt such practices as necessary
for the detection and prevention of
money laundering.
The Anti-Corruption
Commission continued to report corruption in the Public Sector. In 2004, they
set up a strategic plan to fight corruption with a view to reducing corruption
to acceptable levels (Annual Report. 2004. Strategic Plan, 2004–2008).
There was political will at that
time, and so, the plan was implemented, resulting in arrests of some high level
politicians and government officials.
In their book on
corruption, Heidenheimer, Arnold J., and Michael Johnson (2001. Political Corruption: Concepts and
Context. Third Edition, New Brunswick/London, Transaction Publishers) reported
wide spread political corruption in Africa, Zambia inclusive, and how the fight
faced a lot of challenges. They observed involvement of politicians, which they
said meant many cases going unreported and investigations lacking political
will. The Office of the Auditor-General Reports
on the Accounts in government departments have continued to reveal abuses of
authority by government officials.
In his book, Mauro claims that the
sale of government contracts or policy through bribery means that the highest
bidder always wins: “The allocation of public procurement contracts through a
corrupt system may lead to a lower quality of public infrastructure and
services”( Mauro, P. “The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public
Expenditure”, in Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, Eds.
Heidenheimer A. & Johnson, M. Transaction Publishers, 2002; p.343). Rather
than choosing contractors by merit and the best potential outcome, corrupt
bureaucrats could harm development by awarding contracts which result in
substandard outcomes. Corrupt government officials may be more likely to choose
to undertake types of government expenditure that allow them to collect bribes.
Rather than seeking projects which would genuinely contribute to development,
bureaucrats will look to find large projects where money can easily be siphoned
out. (A Heidenheimer & M Johnson, Transaction Publishers, 2002).
If corruption takes the form of a
kickback, the total amount available for public purposes is reduced. Shleifer
and Vishny noted that because of the need to maintain secrecy, corruption
causes a greater distortion in economic activity than taxation. For example,
dishonest government officials may favour promoting government activities,
where bribery is most easily concealed.
Corruption invariably increases
transaction costs and uncertainty in an economy while lowering efficiency by
forcing entrepreneurs to divert their scarce time and money to bribery rather
than production. Those paying the highest bribes may be those with the best
insider information and funding rather than those who would be most productive
and reap the best rewards for development.
Corruption encourages competition in
bribery, rather than in quality and in the price of goods and services. It
inhibits the development of a healthy marketplace and distorts economic and
social development. Evidence shows that if corruption is not contained, it will
grow exponentially (Transparency International, TI Sourcebook, 2000,
p.31).
Corruption
reduces opportunities for the government to control the economy and limits
potential spending. A Mauro notes: “Corruption may also bring about loss of tax
revenue when it takes the form of tax evasion”. It can create fiscal weakness
which in order to compensate for decreasing tax revenue, may force an increase
in rates of taxation on a diminishing number of taxpayers thus reducing its
ability to provide essential public goods and services.
Corruption
undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. The harmful effects
of corruption are especially severe on the poor, who are hardest hit by
economic decline, are most reliant on the provision of public services, and are
least capable of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and the
misappropriation of economic privileges. Thus corruption when anlysed in
details can be seen as observed by the World Bank to be’ “…one of the greatest
enemies of development.” (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm ).
CHAPTER THREE
FINDINGS
There have been
many anti-corruption attempts in Zambia targeting the Public Sector, but with
very little success. Despite the many efforts and good laws (such as the
Anti-Corruption Commission Act) meant to fight corruption, incidences of
corruption was on the increase. Reports of the Office of the Auditor General
have continued to reveal high levels of corruption, and a number of corruption
cases were in the courts of law at the time of this report, even with the many
convictions of former public workers during the period 2002 to 2012.
Literature on
sub-Sahara Africa reveals that many anti-corruption institutions and integrity
systems, although some have had notable success, have not been able to
eliminate or significantly reduce corruption in Africa. However, the picture is
a bit different in Western Countries (North America and Western Europe) where
very low levels of corruption exist due to strong institutions and political
will.
Zambia’s
socio-economic and political reforms programmes since independence and in
recent times after the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1990 have
consistently recognized the need for institutions of good governance measures.
These measures include accountability and transparency, seeking to reduce the
harmful effects of institutional and legal weaknesses that provide
opportunities for behaviours and practices that can undermine the country’s
socio-economic development through corruption.
THE CIVIL SERVICE
The Public
Service Commission is responsible for appointments, promotions, and discipline
of all civil servants in the government. The head of the civil service is the
secretary of the cabinet, who is an appointee of the president.
In ministries,
the most senior civil servant is the permanent secretary, who is the
controlling officer. The secretary of the cabinet supervises all permanent
secretaries, also presidential appointees. Theoretically, all permanent
secretaries and other civil servants are supposed to be professionals and
nonpartisan.
There were
allegations by most respondents that the civil service had been politicised by
presidential appointments. They noted that this situation led to reported cases
of civil servants having actively participated in partisan politics in the
past, and that most of the top officials arrested and prosecuted for corruption
had been those connected to politics.
PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES
Procurement of public goods and services had been prone to
corruption in Zambia, and consequently the Zambia National Tender Board Act
(now Zambia Public Procurement Authority Act) was passed. The Act established
the Zambia National Tender Board to regulate, monitor, and control national
procurement of public goods and services.
It
was believed that the board was not independent of the executive, who could
influence decisions in the procurement processes. Such influences could cascade
downward to the central tender board and other lower tender committees in
ministries, as well as in local government units.
GAPS IN THE JUDICIARY
The retirement
age for superior court judges was constitutionally fixed at sixty years, but
the president had the power to extend the tenure of any judge for an additional
seven years without any ratification. This had been alleged to provide a
fertile ground for political patronage and for compromising judicial
independence.
FORMS
OF CORRUPTION
From preliminary
interviews of various personalities and civil societies, and review of various
literatures on corruption in Zambia, three categories of corruption were
common. First is political corruption, including political patronage. Political
corruption involved misuse of public resources to fund elections, commission of
electoral irregularities, or misuse of public resources to advance individual
and/ or party interests or to secure certain public offices.
The second
category of corruption was grand corruption, largely committed by bureaucrats,
involving large amounts of money through procurements, misappropriation of
public funds, kickbacks from privatization of state enterprises, kickbacks from
government agreements or contracts, and the like. In certain other literature
reviewed, this category of corruption was sometimes referred to as
“bureaucratic corruption,” because mainly bureaucrats or public servants
perpetuated it.
The third
category of corruption, but by no means harmless, is petty corruption, which
was perhaps the most visible and was encountered by ordinary citizens as they
go about their daily lives. It was observed by Transparency
International–Zambia that this type of corruption was widespread in many public
offices and institutions, such as the police service, the courts, immigration,
revenue, national registration and pensions, and passport issuance.
POLICY AND
PRACTICE
Attempts to
reduce the incidence of corruption and improve governance quality in general
had been at the centre of policy co-ordination and policy advice led by international
organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and other
organisations involved in issues of international development such as the
Department for International Development of the UK (DFID).
The IMF commits
to work with its members to promote good governance and to prevent and address
corruption in areas where it has a mandate and expertise. The most prominent
among these were public resource management, tax administration, financial
sector soundness and central bank safeguards. The IMF’s stand was that tackling
corruption required strong and transparent procedures and institutions that
would ensure accountability. Like the World Bank, the IMF too provided
technical assistance to Zambia to strengthen the capacity to combat corruption.
TANGIBLE COSTS OF CORRUPTION
The
costs of corruption in Zambia have been revealed in a number of studies. Respondents
estimated that the government had been paying between ten and fifty percent
more for goods than they should have otherwise been paying. Most respondents said that Graft and
corruption had strongly affected development efforts negatively, leading to the favouring of inefficient
producers, the unfair and inequitable distribution of scarce public resources,
and the leakage of revenue from government coffers to private hands. The impact
of this on development is that the government is less able to spend on genuine
development projects.
DISTORTION OF
PUBLIC ASSETS VALUE
Political Corruption
tends to distort the allocation of public funds and sale of public assets in a
way that produces political rents or unlawful economic rents. Most respondents
indicated that the sale of government resources during privatization was one
example of this.
FORMS OF
CORRUPTION
Patronage. The assignment of government
positions to political supporters. This has
long been a practice in Zambian politics according to most respondents. While
civil service regulations at the national and state level may effectively
curtail the number of patronage jobs, political appointments remain at the top
levels of government and provide a legitimate way for elected politicians to
influence bureaucracy through the appointment of legal executive officials. The
process becomes corrupt when appointees are expected to pay for their jobs in
one way or another. The custom of rewarding wealthy campaign contributors with
appointments as ambassadors has been traditional in presidential politics. This
is also supported by Leslie Holmes in his book(1993, p.205).
Nepotism.
The
granting of public office on the bases of family ties is a form of corruption
said to have been practiced in Zambia over a long period of time.
Shared experience.
Instances
where the patron and client have usually worked together in the past and are on
good terms and the patron promotes or has promoted the client on the basis of
the past experience and warm relationship, is common practice in Zambia. Over
60% of interviewees mentioned this as a common practice when it comes to
government positions, and that it is not considered as corruption.
MAIN ACTORS
The
main actors in the fight against corruption in Zambia comprise government
institutions, governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations.
Government institutions comprise the Anti-Corruption Commission, Drug
Enforcement Commission, Office of the Auditor General, Zambia Police and
Supervisory Authhorities. Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations
comprise the United Nations System, Transparency International, and local NGOs.
STRATEGIES USED
IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION
The Anti-Corruption Commission pays incentives for
reported corrupt activities. There is also protection offered to whistle
blowers to encourage members of the public to report incidences of corruption.
On the other hand, heavy punishments by courts of law are meant to discourage
people from engaging in corrupt activities.
CAUSES OF
CORRUPTION
Leslie Holmes
(1993 p.157) categorises the causes of corruption into three categories:
Cultural factor:
Most corruption is because of traditional attitudes towards family, kinship.
The other
cultural factor is a weak tradition of the rule of law and low level of respect
for the law. In Zambia, tribalism which is said to be widely practiced falls
into this category.
Psychological.
Some individuals are "naturally evil" and will commit criminal acts,
including corrupt ones in any type of system. The external factors,
individual's relationship to the group is also important. According to Holmes
(1993, p. 165) “the power of both peerpressure and peer-comparison can be
great, for instance in the words of one artist - when the best of people take
bribes, isn't it the fool who doesn't?” In other words, if individuals see
others around them benefiting from corruption, they may well choose to indulge
too. Many people interviewed talked of civil servants building big houses
around Lusaka using corrupt practices as falling into this category.
Fear.
According to Holmes (1993, p.170) “The other psychological factor of fear
also can encourage people to act corruptly. For example in a
hierarchical situation a subordinate may fear the consequences of not acting in
a similar way to his/her corrupt superior. In this case, it is common practice
in Zambia, according to respondents for middle managers to get involved in
corrupt activities for fear of being fired or losing favour with the boss.
Human weakness.
Some people find it difficult to reject offers from a person of a
"generous" nature. Some officials will accept gifts because they know
they have been particularly helpful to someone and either feels they "deserve"
a reward (that is they feel that a reward is not inappropriate), or else
genuinely do not want to offend or embarrass a grateful supplicant.
Nepotism.
According to Holmes (1993) “nepotism as a form of corruption can be explained in
psychological term, "The blood is thicker than water" syndrome
wanting to help one's family.
Monopoly
Power. This is where officials who have monopoly power
over provision of a government good extract bribes from clients.
Monopoly power could exist for the legal reason that certain officials are the
only ones charged with performing a certain task
Discretion.
The greater the amount of discretion which is given to an agent, the more
opportunities there will be for agents to give "favorable"
interpretations of government rules and regulations to businesses in exchange
for illegal payments. For example in terms of the level of discretion, when a
custom agent is allowed to apply one of several tariff rates to a product, or
when a tax inspector is given substantial room to decide whether companies are
given deductions or not, there will be an incentive to demand a bribe in
exchange for offering favorable treatment.
Judicial
System. The judicial system also has an
important role in giving opportunities for corrupt acts. The separation of the
three governmental branches in Zambia was meant to avoid this trap. The
challenge is that in practice, the executive has obvious dominance over the
judiciary branch.
Low
Wages. Most of the respondents claimed that low wages in
the public sector leads to corruption. This was also confirmed with available
literature from research carried out in other countries. "For civil
servants, the reward structure within the state administration has
traditionally been seen as one of the key determinants in the evolution of
corruption. If officials are paid wages comparable to those available to
performance, the potential gains from engaging in corruption may not be large
enough in relative terms to make it worth the risk. If instead, officials in
the public sector are paid wages well below those for similar duties in the
private sector, then opportunities for corruption may become the principal
reason for choosing a public sector post." (Klitgaard 1998)
Poor
drafting of laws and regulations. The poor drafting of
laws and regulations also creates many opportunities for
corrupt acts. For example, imprecise drafting and ill-defined terminology gives
tax inspectors and custom officers a large margin of discretion, which they use
to extract bribes. Particularly at the regional and local government level, tax
requirements may be undocumented or not publicly available.
High tax rates.
The
business community in Zambia commonly argued that its total tax burden, as a
share of profits, is excessive due to the simultaneous taxation of turnover,
wage costs, profits, such that full compliance may leave almost no after-tax
profit. Many smaller enterprises do not pay taxes, and larger firms falsify their
revenues. Many interviewed businesses suggest that firm’s total tax obligations
are widely accepted to be negotiated settlement between a business and its tax
inspector. This creates opportunity for corruption.
Foreign
Economic Aid. Literature dealing with foreign economic
aid recognizes that government-to-government foreign
economic assistance often can promote those conditions that foster corruption.
This is especially the case when a significant degree of corruption is clearly
present in recipient countries. According to Jim Saxton (1999) foreign aid can
promote corruption by strengthening the governmental sector relative to the private sector.
CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF
FINDINGS
Beginning
with an analysis of the academic perspectives on corruption, this research
investigated the Zambian Public Sector to establish the impact of corruption on
economic development. The public sector was chosen as it comprise departments
that implement government economic policy and thus the impact of corruption is
more readily and clearly identifiable. Extensive reports of corruption in the
public sector make government departments well suited to investigation.
Empirical
evidence suggests that although strong enforcement and monitoring are needed,
they have little long-term effect if the basic conditions that encourage
corruption and payoffs are not addressed. Thus anti-corruption efforts should
focus on making substantial improvements in the overall efficiency, fairness,
and legitimacy of the state, by addressing those underlying incentives to
receive or pay bribes through fundamental reforms.
EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
Economic
and Political Development: There are many examples
where interviewed businessmen assert
that there are many cases that tax inspectors from the ZRA without any
explanation may keep the imported
good in the custom department and return only after the extortion of some extra bribes. Thus corrupt practices in tax and customs administration do
great damage to the revenue collection.
Budget
Deficit: The other effect of reduced revenue is
the budget deficit. Corruption reduces State revenues, which in its place raise
the budget deficit. According to Miksell(1995)
“The effects of
continuing large budget deficits are expected to be largely long term. Deficits
threaten long-term economic growth in the national savings which may be used to
finance investment or accommodate government deficits. Given the overall savings
rate, the deficits absorbs savings that otherwise could have been productively invested.
On the other
hand, continuing large deficits leaves higher interest obligations in the
future. Each succeeding government will find a large, usually increasing share
of national resources to be already committed, not to provide services to those
paying taxes in that year but to cover interest or funds spent to provide
service in the past.
Project
Selection:
Corruption
may also affect growth through public investment and expenditure. The effect
here may be due to adverse selection of public investment projects or bias in
allocation of public funds towards large and capital-intensive projects. In the
case of adverse selection, projects with higher political returns may be
selected at the expense of projects with higher economic and social returns –
with the consequence of inefficiencies and lower (or perhaps negative) growth
effects.
Economic
Growth:
Corruption
also affects economic growth through its adverse effects on the quality of governance institutions in general.
Corruption affects the optimising decisions of economic actors through the distortions it causes in
the cost and incentive structures they face.
COMBATING
CORRUPTION
Some scholars
believe that corruption cannot be eradicated. For example Yeh (1987, P15) has
argued that "the systematic sharing of bribes between cadres at different
levels of responsibility have made it hopeless to fight corruption in Mainland
China." But if corruption cannot be eradicated it does not mean that
corruption cannot be taken under the control.
World
Bank View: According to World Bank, institutional
strengthening is a key part of country anti-corruption strategies. One of the
most important institutions is a professional and well-motivated civil service.
The selection and promotion in civil service should be merit
based rather than patronage. This system is workable in the Zambian situation.
Judicial System:
Enforcement of anti-corruption legislation requires an efficient, accountable
judiciary. Reform of judicial system should concentrate on the independence of
this branch. The procedures for appointment, extension of contract and removal
of judges should be defined properly, or ratified by parliament. The court
administration of Cases which sometimes may last for months should be improved.
The strict enforcement of rules and regulations, as well as speeding up cases
is very important in combating corruption. If an official knows that rules and
regulations are strictly and consistently enforced he/she will less likely
engage in corrupt behaviour.
Good financial management:
Government
expenditures should have audit trails, and protect honest staff. Audit and control are a
valuable instrument for improving government fiscal management and for
increasing the efficiency in the allocation of public financial resources. The introduction
or reinforcement of auditing would be particularly important because it
intervenes before resources are committed. Therefore, corrupt activities could
be stopped before they would have an impact on the use of resources.
Tax and customs:
ZRA
is the focus of major fraud and corruption, and thus employees are candidates
for inclusion in national strategies to control corruption. Tax system must be
reformed to reduce the tax burden. The tax law should be simplified and
strictly defined because imprecise drafting and ill-defined terminology give tax
inspectors a large margin of discretion and facilitate corruption.
Organizational restructuring, for example, separating the tax assessment
function from the collection function and staff rotation can also help to
reduce opportunities for corruption, as can control systems that require supervisors
to attest that they have checked the work of subordinates.
Anticorruption Campaigns:
Such campaigns can have a legitimizing effect, in that they usually suggest
that the state is serious about fighting corruption. But if they are poorly
managed, they can have either little or a negative impact. Their impact fades
over time if they are too prolonged, since citizens become almost immune to
them, and the campaign begins to sound like mere rhetoric. They can even exert
a negative influence if they stay merely at the level of declarations and are
not accompanied by meaningful action.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Corruption is a
multifaceted issue that pervades all aspects of the public and private sectors,
and cannot be addressed through legal reforms and enforcements without tackling
the underlying incentives for corruption. This therefore means that the
government needs to develop a comprehensive anticorruption strategy.
Zambia’s
socio-economic and political reforms and programmes since independence and in
recent times after the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1990 have
consistently recognized the need for institutions of good governance measures.
These measures include accountability and transparency, and seek to reduce the
harmful effects of institutional and legal weaknesses that provide
opportunities for behaviours and practices that can undermine the country’s
socio-economic development and political enhancements.
These
anti-corruption measures, however, have most often been done in unfavourable
manner. Consequently, their impact on preventing and combating corruption in
the country has not been adequately commensurate with the efforts and fiscal
resources involved.
The presence of corruption has negative
implications for economic growth, with greater effect for longer-term
sustainability. Transparency International’s views corroborate with these
findings. They suggest that “Most importantly, the heaviest cost is typically
not so much in the bribes themselves, but rather in the underlying economic
distortions they trigger and in the undermining of institutions of
administration and governance (Transparency International, TI Sourcebook, 2000,
p.32)
The effect
of corruption is widespread – not only in administrative, financial and social
terms, but also in undermining accountable and democratic government. The
impact of corruption on development is incontrovertibly damaging and
destructive for all aspects of development.
This research
paper identified the challenges and impact of corruption in the Public Sector
on the economic development of Zambia as a country, and recommended ways of
best fighting corruption in the Public Sector.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There should be a professional and
well-motivated civil
service. The selection and promotion in civil service
should be merit based rather than patronage. Pay of civil servants should be
comparable to the private sector.
2. The judicial system needs to be
reformed. Enforcement of anticorruption legislation requires an efficient and
accountable judiciary.
3. Government should develop well-functioning
budget processes, allocate resources strategically, and enable programs and projects
to be implemented efficiently and effectively.
4. Audit
and control should be given more attention. It is very important
because it intervenes before resources are committed. Therefore, corrupt
activities could be stopped before they would have an impact on the use of
resources.
5. The
Tax system must be reformed to reduce the tax burden.
6. State should continue conducting anticorruption
campaigns to show that the state is serious about fighting corruption.
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Anti-Corruption
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Bank of Zambia Anti-Money Laundering
Directives 2004
Electoral Act (Chapter 13 of the
Laws of Zambia)
Heidenheimer,
Arnold J., and Michael Johnson (eds.). 2001. Political Corruption: Concepts
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